After Afghan Taliban refusal to participate in the talks, which the four-nation Quadrilateral Coordination Group had arranged early this month, the much-expected peace process in Afghanistan could not be put on track. The refusal by the Afghan Taliban to take part in the peace process is somewhat surprising as earlier they had agreed to participate in the talks.
Different reasons may have triggered the refusal by the Afghan Taliban to take part in the talks. The foremost seems to be the growing strength of the Taliban on the battleground. But the Taliban refusal to talk and the increasing loss of writ of the Afghan government would have far-reaching negative consequences and even the division of the country cannot be ruled out.
The Taliban have been gaining significant victories in many parts of Afghanistan, particularly since early 2015. Currently, the southern province of Helmand is about to fall to the Taliban and experts are fearing that in the next three to four months the group may have total control in a couple of provinces. According to eminent journalist and expert on Afghanistan, Ahmed Rashid, the fall of cities and provinces to the Taliban would result in the division of Afghanistan. Rashid’s forecast may be tantamount to a doomsday scenario, but it could be a possibility. Because it has only been the military might of the international forces after their occupation of Afghanistan in 2001, after ousting the Taliban regime, which has had kept Afghanistan united. Because the ethnic divisions had practically divided war-ravaged Afghanistan during Pashtoon Taliban rule between 1996 to 2001, with the latter’s killing and, at times, attempting the ethnic cleansing of their Tajik and Uzbek rivals. The Taliban government, too, had used mainly armed force to keep Afghanistan one country which previously had been controlled by various ethnic warlords in different parts of the country.
The presence of international forces may have kept Afghanistan physically united, but politically and psychologically, today it is not one country. For instance, look at the protest of Mr. Abdullah Abdullah, now Afghanistan’s chief executive officer, a de-facto prime minister, over the winning of presidential elections by Pashtoon-backed, Ashraf Ghani. Abdullah and his Tajik community of Afghanistan refused to accept the results of the 2014 presidential elections. His protest led to recounting in which Ghani was declared the winner again. Still, Abdullah refused and had to be accommodated as CEO, with the intervention of the United States, in order to keep Afghanistan stabilized. However, it has largely been the failure of the US-led Western coalition, which has failed to bring political stability to Afghanistan despite spending more than one trillion dollars. According to Ahmed Rashid, even now there is no plan for state-building or nation-building in Afghanistan in place. At the same time the military situation in Afghanistan, according to Rashid, “has never been worse than it has been now.”
This is a situation where the division of Afghanistan is a clear danger. The Afghan government has also been fearing and foreseeing this; therefore, there has been increasing requests from Kabul to the US and NATO not to pull out their residual forces from Afghanistan and even demands for deployment of more forces. In case the US and its Western allies agree and place more forces in Afghanistan, this would only be a temporary solution. Because if 15 years of a heavy presence exceeding more than 150,000 men with sophisticated military technology and state of the art armory could not bring political stability to Afghanistan, how would the country stabilize now when the main insurgent group is stronger than at any point in time during these 15 years and also refusing to talk?
On their part the Afghan Taliban are refusing to talk, at the moment, perhaps to achieve as many military victories as possible, expecting to capture a province or two in the upcoming Spring Offensive, starting traditionally each April, and to enter negotiations from a position of strength. Because this could give the Taliban a larger share in the future political dispensation in Afghanistan. Otherwise, with the Taliban negotiated return to power in Afghanistan, with the existing battleground equation the power-brokers may not give the group a large enough chunk of power. However, the Tajik and Uzbek leadership, including CEO, Abdullah Abdullah, and several provincial governors, as well as the anti-Taliban elements of the security establishment of Afghanistan have been critically against talks with the Taliban and giving them any share in power. This the Taliban know well and think that only battleground victories would force the Afghan government to give them as much power as the group would demand. The Taliban also know that military strength would be the element which would help them keep Afghanistan united in case the constitutional government would fail to do so in any future scenario. In other words, the Taliban would like to project themselves as the only force having the capacity to keep Afghan nationhood intact. This would force the international community to not only recognize the Taliban but also acceed to their terms.
The second reason for the Taliban refusal to talk to the Afghan government is being explained as the unwarranted statements from Pakistan’s Advisor on National Security Sartaj Aziz, regarding the influence his country has over the Taliban. Speaking at the United States think tank Council on Foreign Relations, recently, he said, “I think people who have dealt with this issue recognize that Taliban in the best of times … did not listen to Pakistan always … and now we have some influence on them because their leadership is in Pakistan and they get some medical facilities; their families are here. So we can use those levers to pressurize them to come to the table.” This was a strange statement because it is an admission of the presence of the Taliban leadership inside Pakistan, which Pakistan has been denying vehemently for over a decade. The motives behind the statement are unclear.
However, it seems that Pakistan wants to make the world believe that Islamabad has great influence over the Taliban, which one fears Pakistan does not have. However, when the Taliban were about to enter peace negotiations this statement is tantamount to torpedoing the process, because it implies that the Taliban are pawns of Pakistan, which the Taliban would not like to accept as they would like themselves to be accepted as an independent group. In fact, the Taliban have been acting independently as much as possible.
The refusal by the Taliban to talk has not only put the future of the peace process at stake, but also endangered the future of the country. The next few months are crucial to determine which way Afghanistan would be moving forward.
Different reasons may have triggered the refusal by the Afghan Taliban to take part in the talks. The foremost seems to be the growing strength of the Taliban on the battleground. But the Taliban refusal to talk and the increasing loss of writ of the Afghan government would have far-reaching negative consequences and even the division of the country cannot be ruled out.
The Taliban have been gaining significant victories in many parts of Afghanistan, particularly since early 2015. Currently, the southern province of Helmand is about to fall to the Taliban and experts are fearing that in the next three to four months the group may have total control in a couple of provinces. According to eminent journalist and expert on Afghanistan, Ahmed Rashid, the fall of cities and provinces to the Taliban would result in the division of Afghanistan. Rashid’s forecast may be tantamount to a doomsday scenario, but it could be a possibility. Because it has only been the military might of the international forces after their occupation of Afghanistan in 2001, after ousting the Taliban regime, which has had kept Afghanistan united. Because the ethnic divisions had practically divided war-ravaged Afghanistan during Pashtoon Taliban rule between 1996 to 2001, with the latter’s killing and, at times, attempting the ethnic cleansing of their Tajik and Uzbek rivals. The Taliban government, too, had used mainly armed force to keep Afghanistan one country which previously had been controlled by various ethnic warlords in different parts of the country.
The presence of international forces may have kept Afghanistan physically united, but politically and psychologically, today it is not one country. For instance, look at the protest of Mr. Abdullah Abdullah, now Afghanistan’s chief executive officer, a de-facto prime minister, over the winning of presidential elections by Pashtoon-backed, Ashraf Ghani. Abdullah and his Tajik community of Afghanistan refused to accept the results of the 2014 presidential elections. His protest led to recounting in which Ghani was declared the winner again. Still, Abdullah refused and had to be accommodated as CEO, with the intervention of the United States, in order to keep Afghanistan stabilized. However, it has largely been the failure of the US-led Western coalition, which has failed to bring political stability to Afghanistan despite spending more than one trillion dollars. According to Ahmed Rashid, even now there is no plan for state-building or nation-building in Afghanistan in place. At the same time the military situation in Afghanistan, according to Rashid, “has never been worse than it has been now.”
This is a situation where the division of Afghanistan is a clear danger. The Afghan government has also been fearing and foreseeing this; therefore, there has been increasing requests from Kabul to the US and NATO not to pull out their residual forces from Afghanistan and even demands for deployment of more forces. In case the US and its Western allies agree and place more forces in Afghanistan, this would only be a temporary solution. Because if 15 years of a heavy presence exceeding more than 150,000 men with sophisticated military technology and state of the art armory could not bring political stability to Afghanistan, how would the country stabilize now when the main insurgent group is stronger than at any point in time during these 15 years and also refusing to talk?
On their part the Afghan Taliban are refusing to talk, at the moment, perhaps to achieve as many military victories as possible, expecting to capture a province or two in the upcoming Spring Offensive, starting traditionally each April, and to enter negotiations from a position of strength. Because this could give the Taliban a larger share in the future political dispensation in Afghanistan. Otherwise, with the Taliban negotiated return to power in Afghanistan, with the existing battleground equation the power-brokers may not give the group a large enough chunk of power. However, the Tajik and Uzbek leadership, including CEO, Abdullah Abdullah, and several provincial governors, as well as the anti-Taliban elements of the security establishment of Afghanistan have been critically against talks with the Taliban and giving them any share in power. This the Taliban know well and think that only battleground victories would force the Afghan government to give them as much power as the group would demand. The Taliban also know that military strength would be the element which would help them keep Afghanistan united in case the constitutional government would fail to do so in any future scenario. In other words, the Taliban would like to project themselves as the only force having the capacity to keep Afghan nationhood intact. This would force the international community to not only recognize the Taliban but also acceed to their terms.
The second reason for the Taliban refusal to talk to the Afghan government is being explained as the unwarranted statements from Pakistan’s Advisor on National Security Sartaj Aziz, regarding the influence his country has over the Taliban. Speaking at the United States think tank Council on Foreign Relations, recently, he said, “I think people who have dealt with this issue recognize that Taliban in the best of times … did not listen to Pakistan always … and now we have some influence on them because their leadership is in Pakistan and they get some medical facilities; their families are here. So we can use those levers to pressurize them to come to the table.” This was a strange statement because it is an admission of the presence of the Taliban leadership inside Pakistan, which Pakistan has been denying vehemently for over a decade. The motives behind the statement are unclear.
However, it seems that Pakistan wants to make the world believe that Islamabad has great influence over the Taliban, which one fears Pakistan does not have. However, when the Taliban were about to enter peace negotiations this statement is tantamount to torpedoing the process, because it implies that the Taliban are pawns of Pakistan, which the Taliban would not like to accept as they would like themselves to be accepted as an independent group. In fact, the Taliban have been acting independently as much as possible.
The refusal by the Taliban to talk has not only put the future of the peace process at stake, but also endangered the future of the country. The next few months are crucial to determine which way Afghanistan would be moving forward.
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