While differences emerged between Pakistan and the United States during the recent Strategic Dialogue on limiting Islamabad’s nuclear weapons, a Republican Party likely presidential candidate has vowed to keep troops in Afghanistan to “protect” Pakistan’s nuclear weapons.
The stand of current Democratic President Barack Obama’s administration and a potential Republican Party candidate, Donald Trump, regarding Pakistani nukes, speaks volumes of the concern which political powers in the US have regarding Pakistan’s nuclear weapons. The demand of Obama’s administration to limit the number of its nukes and Trump’s vision to “protect” Pakistan’s nuclear weapons tell us what are Washington’s plans for Pakistan’s nuclear programme. All this not at all sounds good for Pakistan, as a strong nuclear programme is one of the few, arguably the only, guarantee of the survivability of the state in a situation of profound animosity emanating from its arch-rival nuclear power, India, as well as Afghanistan.
During the recent Strategic Dialogue in Washington, US Secretary of State John Kerry asked Pakistan to curtail the number of nuclear weapons significantly. He said: “Nuclear safety is of obvious concern to both our countries, and I expect that we will continue to discuss the obligations of being a responsible state with nuclear weapons in the coming year. I think it’s important for Pakistan to really process that reality and put that front and centre in its policy. And we look forward to Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif’s participation in the Nuclear Security Summit next month.” Kerry recalled that the US and Russia once had more than 50,000 atomic warheads each but they reduced those to 1,500 each and were working on further reductions.
In response Pakistan rightly argued that it would not accept any imposed curbs on its nuclear programme and that any reduction should apply to India as well. In fact, Pakistan pointed out that the US should also consider Pakistan’s concerns on the growing weapons disparity between itself and India.
For Pakistan, limiting its nuclear weapons unilaterally while its main nuclear competitor, India, continues to produce weapons, obviously would be tantamount to digging one’s own grave. Kerry’s drawing parallels of a nuclear equation between India and Pakistan with the Cold War between the USA and USSR is misplaced. This is evident from the words of Kerry in which he mentioned that the US and USSR each curtailed nuclear weapons from 50,000 to 1,500. This curtailment was the result of mutual agreement and was not done unilaterally by either side. This was obvious from the two landmark treaties that were Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty (SALT) and Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) between Washington and Moscow in the 1970s and 1980s. So how can Pakistan, which is at a disadvantage regarding India in conventional weaponry, be expected to reduce the number of its nuclear weapons when India is not asked to do so?
While Washington’s concern about Pakistan’s nuclear weapons may be justified from the former’s standpoint, but the US leadership should also acknowledge the fact that nukes, despite the weapons of last resort, are the only guarantee of the survival of the Pakistani state. Pakistan has always, and very correctly so, had intense doubts of Washington’s intentions or capacity to appreciate Pakistan’s genuine concerns about its security. Examples are rife of America’s cavalier dismissal of Pakistan’s security position, especially in the face of the Indian unrelenting threat to Pakistan. The latter cannot cede an inch to Indian rapacity, what to speak of quantitative reduction of nuclear weapons. So, for Pakistan’s stability and security, nuclear weapons are a must and, therefore, instead of pushing Pakistan to reduce its nuclear weapons, the US must help Pakistan to strengthen its nuclear capacity as well as to build the capacity of the state in other areas like education and the economy.
Indubitably, the US has been contributing significantly to build Pakistan’s capacity in the realm of education and the economy, but given the hard strategic realities of the South Asian region, Islamabad itself could not concentrate on improving its capacity in the vital sectors of the economy and education. Therefore, as long as Pakistan is not reassured about its military-strategic security, it would not be able to focus on the social sectors. In this context having a credible minimum nuclear deterrence is indispensable. The US continues to nudge Pakistan to have increasingly improved safety measures in place to secure its nuclear weapons. Pakistan already has well-placed nuclear safety regimes in place.
On the political front, if the US wants to convince Pakistan to reduce its nuclear weapons, then it must play an instrumental role in prevailing upon India to resolve the Kashmir conflict, which is a main bone of contention between the two South Asian countries. Simultaneously, Washington should also use its influence to persuade India to reduce its nuclear weapons; only then it can assay asking Pakistan to curtail the number of nukes it has.
Trump’s argument that if he came to power, he would keep US troops in Afghanistan in order to protect Pakistan’s nuclear weapons, this is a very serious issue for Pakistan. For how long would Washington keep its troops in Afghanistan, because there is no way Pakistan could give up its nuclear program. As long as Pakistan survives as a state, and we see no other course, Islamabad should have the option to build as many nuclear devices as are imperative for its security.
Trump said during his electioneering on March 03: “I think you have to stay in Afghanistan for a while, because of the fact that you are right next to Pakistan, which has nuclear weapons and we have to protect that.” The use of the word “while” is disturbing, because this means that Trump has in his head a very clear strategy of what to do with Pakistani nukes. Irrespective of Trump’s strategy, Pakistan’s nukes would remain safe and secure.
To induce Pakistan to negotiate with India meaningfully, India must be asked to enter into talks with a purpose and that is to resolve all the outstanding issues between the two countries equitably.
If Pakistan were to be diplomatically and militarily isolated as India wants, this would have negative repercussions on the peace and stability of the entire region. Given the central role of Pakistan, particularly its people and the armed forces in the war on terror, this war could only be won in the region if Pakistan remains on board.
Therefore, the most appropriate policy to avoid a possible nuclear war in South Asia and to prevent nuclear proliferation, is to make both Pakistan and India sit at the negotiations table and to make them agree to reduce their nuclear weapons simultaneously. However, for this to happen the sources of conflict between the two countries have to be addressed, otherwise no amount of arm-twisting could achieve the desired results.
The stand of current Democratic President Barack Obama’s administration and a potential Republican Party candidate, Donald Trump, regarding Pakistani nukes, speaks volumes of the concern which political powers in the US have regarding Pakistan’s nuclear weapons. The demand of Obama’s administration to limit the number of its nukes and Trump’s vision to “protect” Pakistan’s nuclear weapons tell us what are Washington’s plans for Pakistan’s nuclear programme. All this not at all sounds good for Pakistan, as a strong nuclear programme is one of the few, arguably the only, guarantee of the survivability of the state in a situation of profound animosity emanating from its arch-rival nuclear power, India, as well as Afghanistan.
During the recent Strategic Dialogue in Washington, US Secretary of State John Kerry asked Pakistan to curtail the number of nuclear weapons significantly. He said: “Nuclear safety is of obvious concern to both our countries, and I expect that we will continue to discuss the obligations of being a responsible state with nuclear weapons in the coming year. I think it’s important for Pakistan to really process that reality and put that front and centre in its policy. And we look forward to Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif’s participation in the Nuclear Security Summit next month.” Kerry recalled that the US and Russia once had more than 50,000 atomic warheads each but they reduced those to 1,500 each and were working on further reductions.
In response Pakistan rightly argued that it would not accept any imposed curbs on its nuclear programme and that any reduction should apply to India as well. In fact, Pakistan pointed out that the US should also consider Pakistan’s concerns on the growing weapons disparity between itself and India.
For Pakistan, limiting its nuclear weapons unilaterally while its main nuclear competitor, India, continues to produce weapons, obviously would be tantamount to digging one’s own grave. Kerry’s drawing parallels of a nuclear equation between India and Pakistan with the Cold War between the USA and USSR is misplaced. This is evident from the words of Kerry in which he mentioned that the US and USSR each curtailed nuclear weapons from 50,000 to 1,500. This curtailment was the result of mutual agreement and was not done unilaterally by either side. This was obvious from the two landmark treaties that were Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty (SALT) and Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) between Washington and Moscow in the 1970s and 1980s. So how can Pakistan, which is at a disadvantage regarding India in conventional weaponry, be expected to reduce the number of its nuclear weapons when India is not asked to do so?
While Washington’s concern about Pakistan’s nuclear weapons may be justified from the former’s standpoint, but the US leadership should also acknowledge the fact that nukes, despite the weapons of last resort, are the only guarantee of the survival of the Pakistani state. Pakistan has always, and very correctly so, had intense doubts of Washington’s intentions or capacity to appreciate Pakistan’s genuine concerns about its security. Examples are rife of America’s cavalier dismissal of Pakistan’s security position, especially in the face of the Indian unrelenting threat to Pakistan. The latter cannot cede an inch to Indian rapacity, what to speak of quantitative reduction of nuclear weapons. So, for Pakistan’s stability and security, nuclear weapons are a must and, therefore, instead of pushing Pakistan to reduce its nuclear weapons, the US must help Pakistan to strengthen its nuclear capacity as well as to build the capacity of the state in other areas like education and the economy.
Indubitably, the US has been contributing significantly to build Pakistan’s capacity in the realm of education and the economy, but given the hard strategic realities of the South Asian region, Islamabad itself could not concentrate on improving its capacity in the vital sectors of the economy and education. Therefore, as long as Pakistan is not reassured about its military-strategic security, it would not be able to focus on the social sectors. In this context having a credible minimum nuclear deterrence is indispensable. The US continues to nudge Pakistan to have increasingly improved safety measures in place to secure its nuclear weapons. Pakistan already has well-placed nuclear safety regimes in place.
On the political front, if the US wants to convince Pakistan to reduce its nuclear weapons, then it must play an instrumental role in prevailing upon India to resolve the Kashmir conflict, which is a main bone of contention between the two South Asian countries. Simultaneously, Washington should also use its influence to persuade India to reduce its nuclear weapons; only then it can assay asking Pakistan to curtail the number of nukes it has.
Trump’s argument that if he came to power, he would keep US troops in Afghanistan in order to protect Pakistan’s nuclear weapons, this is a very serious issue for Pakistan. For how long would Washington keep its troops in Afghanistan, because there is no way Pakistan could give up its nuclear program. As long as Pakistan survives as a state, and we see no other course, Islamabad should have the option to build as many nuclear devices as are imperative for its security.
Trump said during his electioneering on March 03: “I think you have to stay in Afghanistan for a while, because of the fact that you are right next to Pakistan, which has nuclear weapons and we have to protect that.” The use of the word “while” is disturbing, because this means that Trump has in his head a very clear strategy of what to do with Pakistani nukes. Irrespective of Trump’s strategy, Pakistan’s nukes would remain safe and secure.
To induce Pakistan to negotiate with India meaningfully, India must be asked to enter into talks with a purpose and that is to resolve all the outstanding issues between the two countries equitably.
If Pakistan were to be diplomatically and militarily isolated as India wants, this would have negative repercussions on the peace and stability of the entire region. Given the central role of Pakistan, particularly its people and the armed forces in the war on terror, this war could only be won in the region if Pakistan remains on board.
Therefore, the most appropriate policy to avoid a possible nuclear war in South Asia and to prevent nuclear proliferation, is to make both Pakistan and India sit at the negotiations table and to make them agree to reduce their nuclear weapons simultaneously. However, for this to happen the sources of conflict between the two countries have to be addressed, otherwise no amount of arm-twisting could achieve the desired results.
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